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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction Company, Inc. 
(Wadsworth) initiated this action in district court seeking 
injunctive relief or, alternatively, damages against Salt Lake 
County (County). Wadsworth was one of two construction companies 
that submitted bid proposals in response to the County7s invitation 
for bids for the work of constructing a county flood control 
project. Wadsworth, the unsuccessful bidder, alleged in its 
complaint that the County improperly rejected its bid proposal as 
non-responsive and awarded the contract to the other bidder, Gerber 
Concrete Construction, Inc. (Gerber), in contravention of the terms 
and conditions set forth in the Invitation to Bid. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Wadsworth initially sought a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction to stop the County and Gerber from 
proceeding with the project (R. 52-55, 29-40). Wadsworth's motion 
for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was 
heard by the district court on September 5, 1985. At the hearing, 
Wadsworth requested a "permanent injunction" (R. 176), and the 
court initially ruled that it would grant a permanent injunction 
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against the County (R. 28) . Following the hearing, Wadsworth 
submitted a proposed order granting a permanent injunction which 
contained findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 86-92) . The 
County filed an objection to the proposed order, findings, and 
conclusions (R. 67-70) together with a memorandum of law (R. 56-
66) . A hearing was held on the County/s objection on September 13, 
1985, and the court subsequently reversed its earlier ruling and 
entered an Order denying Wadsworth's motion for injunctive relief 
(R. 97-98). 
Following completion of the construction of the flood control 
project by Gerber, the County filed a motion for summary judgment 
and supporting memorandum (R. 110-125). The motion was initially 
heard and granted by the court on June 22, 1987 (R. 126-128). 
Thereafter, Wadsworth filed a motion for relief from judgment and 
rehearing (R. 131-135). The County's motion for summary judgment 
was reheard on June 29, 1987, at which time the court granted the 
motion in part and denied it in part (R. 189-190) . The court ruled 
that Wadsworth was no longer entitled to seek injunctive relief due 
to mootness (the project having been completed) but could continue 
to seek monetary damages against the County. 
On July 12, 1989, Wadsworth filed a motion for summary 
judgment, affidavit, and supporting memorandum (R. 224-284), 
alleging that Wadsworth was entitled to recover damages in the 
nature of lost profits under two separate theories, namely: (1) 
"breach of contract to award the project to Wadsworth" and (2) 
"negligence in considering and rejecting Wadsworth's bid" (R. 225) . 
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The County filed a memorandum in opposition to Wadsworth's motion 
(R. 331-357), together with six opposing affidavits (R. 289-330). 
On December 14, 1989, the court entered its order granting 
Wadsworth/s motion for summary judgment "as prayed." (R. 429-431)• 
The County filed its notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court on January 12, 1990 (R. 434-435). On April 24, 1990, the 
Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of 
Appeals for disposition. The Court of Appeals heard oral argument 
on May 30, 1991 and filed its Opinion on September 30, 1991, 
vacating the summary judgment of the trial court and remanding the 
case for further proceedings. On October 15, 1991, Wadsworth filed 
a petition for rehearing, which was denied by the Court of Appeals 
on December 17, 1991. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In July of 1985, Salt Lake County invited bids for the work of 
constructing a flood control project known as the Scott Avenue 
Basin on Millcreek at 800 East, by issuing a public Invitation to 
Bid to all licensed and qualified construction contractors (R. 2-3, 
209) . 
Prior to issuing the Invitation to Bid, the County contracted 
with an independent consultant, Eckhoff, Watson and Preator 
Engineering (Consultant), to assist the County in preparing bid 
documents, advertising the project for bids, attending the bid 
opening, reviewing the tabulation of bids, and advising the County 
as to the proper action to be taken regarding the award of the 
contract (R. 290-292). 
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The County designated the bidding to be under sealed 
competitive public bidding and designated the date of July 29, 
1985, at 11:30 a.m., as the time when all bids would be opened and 
publicly read and an apparent low responsible bidder designated (R. 
3, 209). 
At the bid opening on July 29, 1985, the County, through its 
designated representatives, opened the sealed bids of all bidders 
on the project (R. 280) . The bid of each bidder was publicly read, 
and Wadsworth was initially designated as the apparent low bidder 
(R. 280) . This was an initial designation and not a final 
designation, being contingent upon the acceptance of the bid 
proposal and the awarding of the contract by the board of county 
commissioners (R. 280, 8). 
The Consultant then tabulated and verified the bids received 
on the project and on July 30, 1985 provided to the County a copy 
of the Bid Tabulation, together with a letter containing the 
Consultant's findings and recommendation (R. 290, 293-302). 
In tabulating and verifying the bids, the Consultant found 
that the bid proposals submitted by both Wadsworth and Gerber 
contained minor extension errors (which were corrected by the 
Consultant in the Bid Tabulation) , and that the apparent low bid 
submitted by Wadsworth contained irregularities on the bid form 
which made Wadsworth7s bid proposal non-responsive to the County's 
invitation to bid (R. 293). In its letter, the Consultant stated: 
The bid submitted by Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction 
Company is not responsive to the invitation to bid 
because it violated the Rules Governing Bids as outlined 
in the Instructions to Bidders. On Schedule D, two 
5 
prices were listed for Item 1 Basin Floodwalls and these 
two prices were also listed in the subtotal for Schedule 
D and the Bidding Schedule Summary. Of the two Total Bid 
amounts listed, one was the apparent low bid, as stated 
above, in the amount of $692,640.48 and the second bid 
was the second low bid amount (behind Gerber's bid) in 
the amount of 792,140.48. This represents an addition to 
the bid form, an alternative proposal, and a modification 
of the bid form which was not specifically called for in 
the contract documents and may result in the County7s 
rejection of the bid because it violated the rules of 
bidding. (R. 293). 
The Consultant made the following recommendation to the 
County: 
Based upon the irregularity of Wadsworth's bid and the 
rules governing bidding, we recommend that the County 
exercise it's right to reject it as not being responsive 
and that the contract be awarded to Gerber Concrete 
Construction. (R. 293) . 
In the County's Invitation to Bid, the following rules were 
included in the Instructions to Bidders under the Rules Governing 
Bids: 
1.3.03 Changes in or additions to the bid form, 
recapitulations of the work bid upon, alternative 
proposals, or any other modification of the bid form 
which is not specifically called for in the contract 
documents may result in the County's rejection of the bid 
as not being responsive to the invitation.... (R. 9). 
1.3.04 The Board of County Commissioners reserves the 
right to reject any and all proposals, and to waive any 
informality in the proposal received. (R. 9). 
The Instructions to Bidders, under the heading "Preparation of 
Bid," included the following instruction: 
1.2.04 On the bidding schedule of the proposal form 
the unit prices shall be written in ink or typed both in 
words and numerals. In cases of discrepancy the amount 
in words shall be construed to be the desired amount. 
(R. 8). 
The County's Invitation to Bid contained the following 
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statement on the Bidding Schedule Summary page: "THE AWARD OF 
CONTRACT, IF MADEf WILL BE TO THE LOWEST RESPONSIVE, RESPONSIBLE 
BIDDER, PURSUANT TO COUNTY ORDINANCE." (R. 23). 
On July 31, 1985, two days after the bid opening, Wadsworth 
sent a letter to Neil Stack, a county employee, which stated: "This 
letter is to clarify some confusion concerning our bid on 
referenced project." (R. 439, exhibit 2). The letter indicated 
that Wadsworth had inadvertently forgotten to erase certain 
penciled-in figures, "thus causing some confusion as to which 
number should be used." (R. 439, exhibit 2). 
On August 14, 1985, the board of county commissioners held a 
public hearing for the purpose of reviewing the bid proposals and 
awarding the contract (R. 268-270). During the hearing, 
Wadsworth's President, Ralph Wadsworth, stated his objections to 
the contract being awarded to Gerber, arguing that the commission 
has the right to waive any irregularities in a bid or to rebid the 
project (R. 269). 
In response, Thomas B. Larson, a deputy county attorney, 
stated that although the bidding instructions allow the board to 
waive any informality in a bid, the informality must not rise to 
the degree that it makes the bid uncertain or ambiguous. He 
further stated that the bid submitted by Wadsworth contained two 
different figures in the total price block, one in pencil and one 
in ink; that the two total price figures submitted by Wadsworth 
straddled the total price figure submitted by Gerber, one high and 
one low; and that if there had been no other bidder within the high 
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to low range of Wadsworth's two figures, then Wadsworth could have 
argued for the higher pencil price by requesting that the pencil 
informality be waived. He noted that the County has on occasion 
waived the ink requirement and the requirement that all prices be 
in writing as well as in numbers (R. 307-312). 
After having reviewed the relevant bidding documents and 
having considered the statements and recommendations of all 
interested parties, the board of county commissioners voted to 
award the contract to Gerber (R. 313-330). 
The board determined that the bid proposal submitted by 
Wadsworth was not acceptable for the following reasons: (1) the 
bid proposal form contained multiple entries in several places, 
including two different figures in the box for the total bid price, 
thus making the bid proposal ambiguous as to the total price; and 
(2) the two different figures in the total bid price space in the 
Wadsworth bid straddled the total bid price of the Gerber bid, thus 
giving the Wadsworth bid a potentially unfair competitive advantage 
by allowing Wadsworth to claim either figure as its intended bid 
(R. 313-330). 
Subsequent to the awarding of the contract to Gerber on August 
14, 1985, Wadsworth took no action to protest the award until after 
construction on the project had commenced, with the result that 
considerable work had been completed by the time Wadsworth's motion 
for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was 
heard by the district court on September 5, 1985 (R. 45, 163). 
After this lawsuit was filed, the County took the depositions 
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of Ralph Wadsworth, Wadsworth's president, and Guy Wadsworth, 
Wadsworth's general manager and estimator (R. 438 and 439). They 
testified that Guy Wadsworth had prepared Wadsworth's bid proposal 
(deposition exhibit 1) and had then given it to Ralph Wadsworth to 
sign and carry to the bid opening. Twenty minutes before the bid 
opening, Ralph Wadsworth called Guy Wadsworth on the telephone and 
told him that he was worried about the bid because he hadn't seen 
any other bidders and their bid was approximately $200,000.00 below 
the engineer's estimate. Ralph Wadsworth testified: 
The engineer's estimate. It was something like 
$900,000. So, I asked him how the hell come ours was 
$692,000, why we were so low. 
And he said, That's the way it turned out. He 
thought he was all right on them, but maybe he better 
have another look at it. So, I told him I would call him 
back. He better look and make sure he didn't make any 
mistakes. 
Then I said, Maybe you better give me a higher 
figure to go in here in case I can't get you back or 
something. What's the possibility of your error, if you 
made an error or something? We discussed that, and we 
arrived at $100,000. 
And I asked him how many guys were bidding the job. 
And he says there was a lot of bidders. And I said, 
There are a lot? I haven't seen anybody yet. Is this 
job more rough than you think it is? Because we never 
had bid a job where there was one or two bidders in the 
last five years. It seems like on County jobs, there are 
eight or ten bidders. 
So, I was worried about it. I was concerned that 
since there wasn't a lot of bidders, maybe the job was a 
lot more difficult than Guy had thought. And due to the 
fact that we were $200,000 under the estimate, he better 
look at it. 
(R. 438, pp. 10-11). Following their telephone conversation, Ralph 
Wadsworth wrote in the higher figures in pencil on the bid proposal 
(R. 438, pp. 9-10). Guy Wadsworth testified: 
Q Were the pencil figures just splitting the 
difference between the estimate, the engineer's estimate, 
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and your figures? 
A Yes. We wanted to put a contingency number in 
in case I had made a serious mistake. And the idea being 
that he would get back to me after I had had a few 
minutes to review it. If for some reason he couldn't get 
through to me because of lack of an available phone or 
whatever reason, we would have to take a chance on being 
kicked out because of the bid being too high. But we 
wanted to hedge our bets, I guess. 
(R. 439, p. 7). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS 
CASE DID NOT DEPART FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. 
Plaintiff first alleges in its petition that review by writ of 
certiorari should be granted in this case because the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision "that has so far departed from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings" as to call for 
an exercise of the Supreme Court#s power of supervision. 
In support of this allegation, plaintiff argues that: "The 
Court of Appeals' decision in this case fails to address or rule 
upon the primary issues raised by Wadsworth." This argument is 
without merit. A review of the record clearly shows that the Court 
of Appeals fully considered all of the relevant issues necessary to 
support the Court's decision to vacate the summary judgment entered 
by the district court and to remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
A. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS FULLY ADDRESSED WADSWORTH'S 
ARGUMENTS PERTAINING TO WHETHER OR NOT A CONTRACTUAL 
RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN THE COUNTY AND WADSWORTH. 
10 
Wadsworth contends that by submitting its bid proposal in 
response to the County'& invitation for bids, it created a 
contractual relationship with the County, which the County then 
breached by failing to accept Wadsworth's bid. Wadsworth argues 
that a "contract" was created and approved by the County Commission 
when the Commission approved the bidding of the project under 
county ordinances and the contract documents upon which bids were 
required to be based (Plaintiff's Petition, pp. 10-11). 
A review of the record in this case shows that this argument 
was fully briefed for the Court of Appeals in the Brief of 
Appellants, Brief of Appellee, and Reply Brief of Appellants. This 
argument was also argued before the Court of Appeals during oral 
argument. This argument was, however, rejected by the Court of 
Appeals in its Opinion. Wadsworth thereafter filed its Petition 
for Rehearing and reasserted this same argument, which was again 
considered and rejected by the Court of Appeals. 
In determining whether there was a contractual relationship 
between the County and Wadsworth in this case, the Court of Appeals 
correctly applied the rule and test previously established by this 
Court in the case of Rapp v. Salt Lake City. 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 
1974) . In Rapp, this Court held that an advertisement for bids is 
not itself an offer, rather the bid is the offer which creates no 
rights until accepted. The Court further ruled that, particularly 
in the case of public contracts, the requirement of certain 
formalities by law, such as a written contract, indicates that even 
after acceptance of the bid, there is still no contract until there 
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has been compliance with the requisite formalities. 527 P.2d, at 
654. 
In the present case, the Court of Appeals correctly determined 
that the requisite formalities under applicable county ordinances 
had not been met, and that, as a result, no contract was created 
that would give Wadsworth any contractual rights. 
The Court of Appeals recognized and specifically noted that in 
this case, the Board of County Commissioners did not approve 
Wadsworth's bid, but in fact, rejected it before any work was 
commenced on the project, and that Wadsworth failed to present any 
evidence of any binding contract created or expressly authorized by 
any ordinance or resolution adopted by the Board. 818 P.2d, at 
602. Thus, the Court fully considered and addressed Wadsworth7s 
arguments pertaining to whether or not a contract existed between 
the County and Wadsworth. 
B. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY APPLIED THE RULES OF LAW 
ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT IN THE RAPP CASE. 
Wadsworth contends in its petition that the Court of Appeals 
did not address Wadsworth's argument that "...the Rapp decision is 
clearly distinguishable from the present case in that different 
legal issues were presented." (Plaintiff's Petition, p. 12). 
Contrary to Wadsworth's assertions, the decision by this Court 
in the Rapp case addressed the same legal issue which is presented 
in the instant case. 
In Rapp, this Court specifically addressed the issue of 
whether a bid proposal submitted in response to an invitation to 
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bid for a public construction contract creates any contractual 
relationship, either express or implied, between the bidder and the 
public authority. The Court concluded that it did not. 
In the Rapp case, the plaintiff sought to recover damages for 
expenses he incurred in preparing and submitting a bid to construct 
a building at the Salt Lake City International Airport. The 
plaintiff protested the City's award of the contract to the 
successful bidder on the grounds that the action of the City was 
not taken in good faith and that the City had failed to disclose to 
the bidders that a competitive advantage had been granted to the 
successful bidder. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, 
which the trial court granted. 
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that he was entitled to 
recover damages on several theories, all of which were rejected by 
this Court. The first theory plaintiff argued was breach of 
contract, contending that he had "a collateral implied in fact 
contract" which was breached by the City: 
Plaintiff urges that in a bidding situation two distinct 
contracts are involved. Under the first contract, since 
the governmental entity might reject all bids, the 
solicitation of bids is not a promise to accept the 
lowest or best bid; plaintiff concedes that the bid is a 
mere offer which must be accepted and all statutory 
formalities fulfilled prior to the existence of a binding 
contract. He insists that there is a second, collateral 
contract under which the government by soliciting bids 
impliedly promises to give fair consideration to all of 
the competitive bids and this promise is supported by the 
time, effort, and expense in so preparing the bid. 
(Emphasis added.) 
527 P.2d, at 654. This Court rejected plaintiff's argument that 
there was any implied contract between the bidder and the 
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government. After first explaining the distinction between express 
and implied in fact contracts, the Court stated thctt there could be 
no contractual liability, express or implied, binding upon the City 
until the requirements of a writing and sanction of the board of 
commissioners had been complied with: 
[1] An ordinary advertisement for a bid is not 
itself an offer, rather the bid or the tender is an offer 
which creates no right until accepted. Particularly in 
the case of public contracts, the requirements of certain 
formalities by law, such as a written contract, indicates 
that even after acceptance of the bid, there is no 
contract until there has been compliance with the 
requisite formalities. (Emphasis added.) 
527 P.2d, at 654. The Court then held that the City's invitation 
to bid and the plaintiff's response thereto could not be 
interpreted as "a manifestation of mutual assent to make a bargain" 
out of which a binding contract could arise: 
[2] The invitation to bid by the City may not be 
interpreted as an offer for a binding contract; this 
action and plaintiff's response may not be reasonably 
construed as a manifestation of mutual assent indicating 
an intention of the parties to be bound by a contract, 
the terms of which were certain. Additionally, 
plaintiff's theory must fail since no contractual 
liability can be created without compliance with the 
previously cited ordinances. 
527 P.2d, at 654. 
Applying the rules established by this Court in the Rapp 
decision to the facts of the present case, there was no contract 
between the County and Wadsworth. The invitation of the County to 
bid and Wadsworth's response cannot be reasonably interpreted as a 
"manifestation of mutual assent to make a bargain, the terms of 
which were certain." First, the County's Invitation to Bid was 
expressly conditioned upon the acceptance of the proposal and the 
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awarding of the contract by the board of county commissioners. 
Thus, there could be no "manifestation of mutual assent to make a 
bargain" prior to the occurrence of that condition. Second, the 
County's ordinances, like the City's ordinances relied upon by the 
Court in the Rapp case, provide that no contract shall be binding 
on the County unless it is reduced to writing and approved by the 
board of county commissioners: 
Contracts. The commission shall make or authorize 
the making of all contracts to which the county may be a 
party, and no contract shall be entered into on behalf of 
or be binding on the county unless it is entered into by 
ordinance or resolution or is reduced to writing and 
approved by the commission, or expressly authorized by 
ordinance or resolution. No such ordinance or resolution 
shall be passed until it has remained on file at least 
one week. 
The Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966 as amended, 
section 1-2-9. Therefore, as recognized by the Court of Appeals in 
its Opinion, there could be no contract between the County and 
Wadsworth until there had been compliance with the requisite 
formalities of an ordinance or resolution or contract reduced to 
writing and approved by the commission. In the absence of the 
required formalities, there was no contract between the County and 
Wadsworth. As a result, there could be no breach of contractual 
duties by the County. 
Wadsworth also contends that "In the present case, the 
Invitation for Bids was much more than an ordinary invitation or 
advertisement for bids." (Plaintiff's Petition, p. 13). However, 
Wadsworth has never presented any evidence establishing what an 
"ordinary" invitation or advertisement is or is not. In fact, the 
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County's invitation for bids is quite ordinary and contains the 
same provisions for bid bonds and other obligations as do the 
invitations for bids issued by most state agencies and 
municipalities in the State of Utah. This point is conceded by 
Wadsworth in its petition, where it states: "Salt Lake County, as 
well as most state agencies and municipalities in the State of 
Utah, impose important obligations on public bidding contractors to 
hold bids open for specified time periods, to provide bid bonds to 
guarantee the contractor will perform if the low bidder, and 
provisions for contractual liquidated damages for withdrawing a low 
bid and refusing to perform the work for the bid amount." 
(Plaintiff's Petition, p. 17). 
In the present case, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded 
that the County's invitation for bids was not an offer. Rather, it 
was only an invitation for offers, and Wadsworth's bid proposal was 
the offer. The fact that Wadsworth's offer contained a promise to 
hold its bid open for sixty days and provide a bid bond does not 
change Wadsworth's bid proposal from an offer into an acceptance. 
This is a basic and fundamental concept in the area of public 
construction contracts, and the Court of Appeals correctly 
determined that "...no contract was created, express or implied, 
that would give Wadsworth contractual rights." 818 P.2d, at 602. 
C. 
IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO ADDRESS 
IN ITS OPINION ALL OF THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PARTIES. 
Wadsworth contends that the Court of Appeals failed to address 
in its opinion certain issues raised by the parties on appeal. 
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While it is true that the Opinion of the Court of Appeals does not 
address all of the issues raised by the parties on appeal, it is 
not improper for an appellate court to decide a case based upon 
certain dispositive issues and, as a result, not reach all of the 
other issues raised by the parties. 
A review of the appellate briefs filed in the Court of Appeals 
in this case shows that there were certain issues that were not 
reached by the Court in its Opinion, such as whether the Board of 
County Commissioners was justified in rejecting Wadsworth's bid as 
non-responsive to its invitation for bids. However, it was not 
necessary for the Court to address all such issues raised by the 
parties, because the Court found sufficient narrower grounds on 
which to vacate the summary judgment entered by the district court 
and remand the case for further proceedings. 
The only remedy sought by Wadsworth in its motion for summary 
judgment was damages in the nature of anticipated lost profits. 
And the only theories of liability asserted in its motion for 
summary judgment were breach of contract and negligence. Thus, it 
was only necessary for the Court of appeals to consider these 
limited issues, and no others, in deciding to vacate the summary 
judgment and remanding this case for further proceedings. 
As noted by the Court in footnote 4 of its opinion, it had no 
occasion to consider the issue of whether Wadsworth might be 
entitled to monetary damages in the nature of bid preparation 
costs, because Wadsworth did not seek this remedy in its motion for 
summary judgment in the district court. 
17 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals had no reason to address, and 
did not address, such issues as whether a wrongfully rejected 
bidder would be entitled to recover monetary dcimages or obtain 
other relief under more appropriate theories of liability such as 
abuse of discretion, fraud, collusion, or other misconduct on the 
part of the awarding authority, because these issues were not 
included in Wadsworth's limited motion for summary judgment. 
POINT II. 
IN DECIDING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES IN 
THE NATURE OF LOST PROFITS UNDER CONTRACT OR NEGLIGENCE 
THEORIES, THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECIDE ANY 
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF MUNICIPAL OR STATE LAW WHICH HAVE 
NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THE SUPREME COURT. 
Wadsworth contends in its petition that if the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is allowed to stand, then "The integrity of the 
bidding system will be destroyed." (Plaintiff's Petition, p. 18). 
If this contention were true, then it would be a serious 
situation indeed. However, the truth is that the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is based upon longstanding precedent, established 
by this Court and others; and the effect of the decision is simply 
to preserve the status quo and the present effectiveness of 
competitive bidding laws in this state, which have evolved through 
the years by statute, ordinance, and common law decisions. 
Contrary to Plaintiff's dire prediction of the imminent demise 
of the public competitive bidding system in the State of Utah as a 
direct result of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the decision 
of the Court of Appeals will serve primarily to strengthen the 
competitive bidding system and "...the very public interest that 
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the competitive bidding laws were designed to protect." 818 P.2d, 
at 602. 
Plaintiff argues that the question of whether a wrongfully 
rejected bidder on a public construction project is entitled to any 
monetary relief (presumably under any theory of liability), is an 
important question of municipal and state law which should be 
decided by the Supreme Court. 
However, as the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, this 
broad issue was not before the Court in the present case. 
Wadsworth's motion for summary judgment only sought to establish 
liability under the theories of breach of contract and negligence. 
Wadsworth's motion for summary judgment did not pursue liability 
under the usual and accepted theories of liability in public 
bidding cases, such as abuse of discretion, fraud, collusion, or 
other misconduct on the part of the awarding authority. Similarly, 
Wadsworth's motion for summary judgment only pursued monetary 
damages in the nature of anticipated lost profits, and not other 
monetary damages such as bid preparation costs.1 
As a result, the Court of Appeals appropriately declined to 
address these issues which were neither properly before it nor 
necessary for its decision. The Court of Appeals decided all 
questions and issues actually before it in accordance with the 
precedents established by this Court. 
1See Annotation, Public Contracts: Low Bidders Monetary 
Relief against State or Local Agency for Nonaward of Contract, 65 
A.L.R.4th 93 (1988) and other authorities cited in footnote 3 of 
the Opinion of the Court of Appeals. 
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CONCLUSION 
In vacating the summary judgment of the district court and 
remanding this case for further proceedings, the Court of Appeals 
fully addressed and considered all relevant arguments raised by the 
parties on appeal. While it is true that the Opinion of the Court 
of Appeals does not address all of the issues raised by the parties 
on appeal, it is not improper for an appellate court to decide a 
case based upon certain dispositive issues and, as a result, not 
reach all of the other issues raised by the parties. In rendering 
its decision, the Court did not depart from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings so as to call for an exercise of the 
Supreme Court's power of supervision. 
In deciding that plaintiff Wadsworth was not entitled to 
damages in the nature of lost profits under contract or negligence 
theories, the Court of Appeals did not decide any important 
questions of municipal or state law which have not already been 
settled by the Supreme Court. 
For the reasons stated above, defendants respectfully 
request that the Court deny plaintiff's petition for writ of 
certiorari. 
Dated this ///^ day of February, 1992. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
S ytf^tf/fREtf H THORPE 
V _ / Deputy County A t t o r n e y 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction Company, Inc. (Wadsworth) 
was the unsuccessful bidder on a public works proJ€*ct in Salt 
Lake County (the County) and sued for damages on contract and 
negligence theories. The trial court awarded Wadsworth damages 
for lost profits on a motion for summary judgment and the County 
appealed. We reverse and remand. 
I. FACTS 
On July 8, 1985, the County invited competitive, sealed bids 
by advertisement for construction of the Scott Avenue Basin flood 
control project on Millcreek. The bid advertisement contained 
instructions and rules governing the bid.1 Wadsworth received 
1. The bid instructions required unit prices to be written in 
ink or typed both in words and numerals. The instructions 
(continued...) 
the bid advertisement and, along with Gerber Concrete 
Construction, Inc. (Gerber) , bid the project. When the bids were 
opened and the figures read publicly, Wadsworth was designated as 
the apparent low bidder, pending final approval by the County 
Board of Commissioners (the Board). 
The County consulting engineers subsequently reviewed the 
bids and discovered irregularities in Wadsworth1s bid. In 
addition to minor computation errors that could be corrected, 
Wadsworth1s bid contained a six digit figure that had been 
penciled in above another number written in ink for the cost of 
the line item "basin floodwall." Both numbers were added to 
other line items in separate calculations of the subtotal for the 
concrete floodwalls. Two different numbers appeared, one in pen 
and one in ink, in the subtotal column on the bid schedule. The 
pencil and ink figures from the subtotal column on the bid 
schedule were again listed in the summary of subtotals and 
entered in the box for the total bid price. The figures 
reflected substantial price differences. Wadsworth1s total high 
and low figures straddled Gerber1s total bid price. The 
consultants recommended that the Board reject Wadsworth's bid as 
not responsive to the bid request. 
On August 14, 1985, the Board held a public hearing to 
review the bid proposals. At the hearing, Wadsworth argued the 
Board could waive the irregularities. Wadsworth had previously 
sent a letter to the County shortly after bids were opened to 
clarify the "confusion as to which number should be used." A 
county attorney advised against waiver, and the Board rejected 
Wadsworth's bid as not responsive and awarded the contract to 
Gerber. Wadsworth then sought to enjoin Gerber from starting 
construction by filing suit in district court, but the court 
allowed the work to go forward. 
When the flood control project was completed, the County 
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the equitable 
relief Wadsworth sought had been rendered moot and that Wadsworth 
was not entitled to the damages requested. The court granted the 
motion in part and denied injunctive relief, but ruled that 
Wadsworth could seek damages for wrongful rejection of its bid. 
Wadsworth then moved for summary judgment and was awarded damages 
for lost profits on contract and negligence theories. The County 
appealed. 
1. (...continued) 
expressly prohibited erasure, interlineation or other correction 
unless such corrections were authenticated by the signature of 
the person signing the bid. 
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is proper only if there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Thomock v. Cook. 604 
P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979). Because disposition of a case by 
summary judgment denies the benefit of trial on the merits, we 
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing 
party. Reeves v. Geiov Pharmaceutical, Inc.. 764 P.2d 636, 640 
(Utah App. 1988). Moreover, because summary judgment is granted 
as a matter of law, we are free to reappraise the legal 
conclusion of the trial court. Luckv Seven Rodeo Core, v. Clark. 
755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988). 
III. REJECTION OF THE BID 
A. Contractual Theory 
The issue of whether an unsuccessful bidder on a public 
works project is entitled to contractual damages was decided in 
Rapp v. Salt Lake Citv> 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974). In Rapp. the 
supreme court denied recovery of damages by an aggrieved bidder 
under either express or implied contract theories. Id. at 655. 
"An ordinary advertisement for a bid is not itself an offer," the 
court reasoned, "rather the bid or tender is an offer which 
creates no rights until accepted." £d. at 654. The supreme 
court also acknowledged that, pursuant to ordinance, formal 
acceptance by the governing authority was required to create a 
binding contract. Id. 
In the present case, the Board is empowered by ordinance to 
make contracts on behalf of the County. No contract is binding 
on the County, however, until it has been approved by the Board 
or authorized by ordinance or resolution.2 In this case, the 
Board did not approve Wadsworth's bid, but in fact, rejected it 
before any work was commenced on the project. Therefore, no 
contract was created, either express or implied, that would give 
Wadsworth contractual rights. Accordingly, damages for 
2. Salt Lake County, Utah, Code of Ordinances, § 2.04.100 
(1990). 
The commission shall make or authorized [sic] the 
making of all contracts to which the county may be a 
party, and no contract shall be entered into on behalf 
of or be binding on the county unless it is reduced to 
writing and approved by the commission, or expressly 
authorized by ordinance or resolution. 
Wadsworth presents no argument that a binding contract was 
created by ordinance or resolution. Accordingly, we do not 
address either of those provisions of the ordinance. 
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anticipated lost profits were inappropriate under either express 
or implied contract theories. 
B. Negligence Theory 
The issue of whether a contractor who is the apparent low 
bidder on a public works contract is entitled to recover damages 
for lost profits for wrongful rejection of its bid is a case of 
first impression in Utah. A substantial majority of the 
jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue have not allowed an 
aggrieved low bidder to recover damages for the failure of a 
public body to award a contract.3 We adopt the majority 
approach and hold that damages for lost profits are not 
recoverable under negligence theory as a matter of Utah common 
law.4 
The rationale for our holding is that the laws governing 
competitive bidding are enacted for the benefit of the general 
taxpaying public and not individual bidders. See Gulf Oil Corp. 
v. Clark County, 94 Nev. 116, 575 P.2d 1332, 1333 (1978). A 
violation of those laws, therefore, is a breach of a duty owed to 
the public and not to an individual. Because damages benefit 
only the interest of an individual bidder, an award of damages 
for lost profits in such instances is contrary to the very public 
interest that the competitive bidding laws were designed to 
3. See City of Scottsdale v. Deem. 27 Ariz.App. 480, 556 P.2d 
328 (1976); Klinaer v. Citv of Favetteville. 297 Ark. 385, 762 
S.W.2d 388 (1988); Rubino v. Lolli, 10 Cal.App.3d 1059, 89 
Cal.Rptr. 320 (1970); Sutter Bros. Constr. Co. Inc. v. Citv of 
Leavenworth. 238 Kan. 85, 708 P.2d 190 (1985); Baker v. State. 
707 P.2d 20 (Mont. 1985); Gulf Oil Corn, v. Clark County, 94 Nev. 
116, 575 P.2d 1332 (1978); M. A. Stephen Constr. Co. v. Borough 
of Rumson, 125 N.J.Super. 67, 308 A.2d 380, cert, denied, 64 N.J. 
315, 315 A.2d 404 (1973); R.S. Noonan, Inc. v. School District of 
Citv of York, 400 Pa. 391, 162 A.2d 623 (1960); Mottner v. Town 
of Mercer Island, 75 Wash.2d 575, 452 P.2d 750 (1969). £££ also 
Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 29.86 (3rd 
Ed. 1990); Annotation, Public Contracts: Low Bidder's Monetary 
Relief against State or Local Aaencv for Nonaward of Contract, 65 
A.L.R.4th 93 (1988); 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Works and Contracts § 
86 (1972). 
4. Since Wadsworth did not seek to recover its bid preparation 
costs, we have no occasion to consider the issue. See Heyer 
Products Co., Inc. v. United States, 135 Ct. CI. 63, 140 F.Supp. 
409 (1956)(unsuccessful bidder may recover bid preparation costs 
where bids are not invited in good faith). We also note, in 
passing, that counties are not included within the scope of the 
Utah Procurement Code and the remedies therein provided. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-56-2, -5(12), -5(25), -47 (1989). 
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protect. In addition, damages for lost profits further burden 
the public coffers already penalized by paying a higher price for 
goods or services. See City of Scottsdale v. Deem. 27 Ariz.App. 
480, 556 P.2d 328, 330 (1976). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We conclude that Wadsworth was not entitled to damages for 
lost profits under either contract or negligence theories. We 
therefore vacate the summary judgment and remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Gregory K. Onne, Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH L. WADSWORTH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah; R. P. HOLDSWORTH, 
DIRECTOR, THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
FLOOD CONTROL DIVISION, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-85-5681 
judge James S. Sawaya 
The Motion of plaintiff - Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction 
Company, inc. for Summary Judgment came on regularly before the 
above entitled Court on November 20, 1989 at 2:00 p.m., the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding. Plaintiff was represented by 
Wilford A. Beesley, Esq. and Stanford P. Fitts, Esq. and defendants 
were represented by Jeffrey H. Thorpe, Esq. The Court, having 
considered the memoranda submitted and arguments of counsel and 
being fully advised in the premises, HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND 
DECREES: 
1 C04?S 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff Ralph L. 
Wadsworth Construction Company, Inc. is hereby gramted as prayed. 
2. Defendants were required to award the subject construction 
project to the low, responsive, responsible-bidder. 
3. Plaintiff was the low, responsive, responsible bidder on 
the subject project and defendants should have awarded the project 
to plaintiff. 
4. Defendants breached contractual duties and duties of due 
care owing to plaintiff in rejecting plaintiff's bid as 
nonresponsive. 
5. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants and each 
of them in the amount of $62,344.15 together with plaintiff's costs 
incurred in this matter and prejudgment interest at the statutory 
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from March 27, 1987 until the 
date of judgment. 
6. Plaintiff is entitled to post judgment interest at the 
statutory rate of twelve percent (12%) per annua from the date of 
this Judgment until paid in full. 
Dated this day of December, 1989. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
/ 
ies S. Sawa^a" 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
1777, rft \-
. Thiols ' , Esq. 
CO 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be hand delivered to the following this _J^_aay of 
December, 1989: 
Jeffery H. Thorpe 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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1.2-1—1-2-4 ADMINISTRATION ORDINANCES 
Chapter 2 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
Sections: 
1-2-1. County Commission — Number — Eligibility 
1-2-2. Term of Office 
1-2-3. Vacancies — How Filled 
1-2-4. Powers and Duties — Omnibus Provision 
1-2-5. Departments 
1-2-6. Meetings 
1-2-7. Special Meetings 
1-2-8. Chairman — Quorum — May Administer Oaths 
1-2-9. Contracts 
Sec 1-2-1. County Commission — Number — Eligibility. The Salt 
Lake County Commission shall consist of three members, each of whom 
shall have been an elector of the county for at least one year immediately 
preceding the election and elected by the qualified, electors of the county 
at large. 
Sec 1-2-2. Term of Office. County commissioners shall be elected at 
the general election next preceding the expiration of the term of office 
of incumbents; one for a term of four years and one for a term of two 
years, and each shall hold office for the term for which elected and until 
a successor is elected and has qualified. 
Sea 1-2-3. Vacancies — How Filled. Whenever a vacancy occurs in 
the board of county commissioners through ineligibility, resignation or 
death of the incumbent or of the officer elect before qualifying, or through 
refusal to act, or for any other reason, the board must fill the vacancy 
by appointment. Should the board fail to make the appointment within 
thirty days after the vacancy occurs, the clerk shall notify the governor 
of the fact, and the governor shall within thirty days after receipt of notice 
fill the vacancy by appointment. If at any time there shall not be a ma-
jority of the board remaining in office, the governor «h«H appoint one 
or two commissioners as the case may be until there shall be a majority, 
and the majority shall select the third as herein provided. Appointees 
shall hold office for the unexpired term. Any appointment under the pro-
visions of this section must be made from a list of at least six persons 
who have been endorsed in writing by the central county committee of 
the party to which the person belonged who occasioned the vacancy. 
Sec 1-2-4. Powers and Duties — Omnibus Provision. The county com-
mission shall be the legislative division of county government and may 
supervise the official conduct of all county and department officers and 
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officers of all precincts, districts and other subdivisions of the county (except 
municipal corporations), and shall see that they faithfully perform their 
duties, direct prosecutions for delinquencies, and, when necessary, require 
them to renew their official bond, make reports and present their books and 
accounts for inspection. The commission shall have such other powers and 
duties as are prescribed by law. 
Sec. 1-2-5. Departments. Each commissioner shall have the supervision of 
such departments and boards of county government as lend themselves to 
joint classification and each department or board shall bear such title and 
designation as the board of county commissioners shall from time to time 
devise, provided, that said title shall, as nearly as possible, represent the true 
nature of those functions performed by the officers and employees of such 
department or board. 
Sec. 1-2-6. Meetings. The Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, shall hold three regular public meetings in each and 
every week during the year in the Commission Chambers in the City and 
County Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, which meetings shall be held on 
Monday and Wednesday at the hour often o'clock A.M., and Thursday at nine 
o'clock A.M., except that in case any of such days falls upon a holiday, said 
meeting shall be deemed adjourned until the next succeeding meeting date as 
aforesaid, provided, however, that the time of said meetings may be changed 
or altered to any other time on the same day by the vote of at least two (2) 
members of the said Board, duly entered into the minutes of any preceding 
meeting thereof; and provided further, that any meeting of the said Board 
may be recessed, once convened, to any other time, place or day prior to the 
next succeeding regular meeting. Any regularly scheduled meeting may be 
cancelled in advance by a vote of any two members of said Board taken at a 
duly convened regular meeting, in the event there will be no business to 
transact or when it is known in advance a quorum cannot be obtained. 
(Amended 5/29/75.) 
Sec. 1-2-7. Special Meetings. Special meetings may be called by any two 
commissioners or by the chairman upon a five-day notice to any absent 
commissioner and upon entry into the minutes of the board of an order signed 
by the members or chairman calling such meeting, provided, that the 
requirement of a notice shall not be binding in any special meeting at which all 
of the members of the commission are present and effectively waive such 
requirement. 
It shall be the duty of the county clerk when given copies of such notices 
to serve or cause the same to be served immediately. 
The order must specify the business to be transacted at such special 
meeting and none other than that specified shall be transacted thereat unless 
all members of the commission are present and consent thereto. 
Sec. 1-2-8. Chairman — Quorum — May Administer Oaths. County com-
missioners shall elect one of their members chairman to preside at all meet-
ings of the board. In case of the chairman's absence or inability to act, the 
(Printed 6/30/80) 
7 
1.2.9-1.3-1 ADMINISTRATION ORDINANCES 
members present must, by an order entered in their minutes, select one of 
their members to act as chairman temporarily. Any member of the board may 
administer oaths to any person when necessary in the performance of his 
official duties. Not less than two members shall constitute a quorum for the 
transaction of business, and no act of the board shall be valid or binding unless 
two members concur therein. 
Sec. 1*2-9. Contracts. The commission shall make or authorize the making 
of all contracts to which the county may be a party, and no contract shall be 
entered into on behalf of or be binding on the county unless it is entered into 
by ordinance or resolution or is reduced to writing and approved by the 
commission, or expressly authorized by ordinance or resolution. No such 
ordinance or resolution shall be passed until it has remained on file at least 
one week. 
Chapter 3 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF 




















Policies and Procedures 
Sec. 1-3-1. Purpose. It is the intent of the board of county commissioners 
to organize the executive department of county government in a manner 
designed to provide service delivery to the public in an efficient and 
coordinated manner. Certain of the divisions, boards and commissions 
described in this chapter have statutory duties and contractual prerogatives 
independent of authority delegated by the board of county commissioners and 
it is not the intent of the board to preempt, abrogate or diminish such 
authority. Neither are the functional descriptions meant to be exhaustive of 
the duties assigned and delegated to the respective organizational 
subdivisions. However, it is deemed necessary by the board of county 
commissioners to include all subdivisions of government within a single 
management structure for purposes of effective administration and 
coordination. Further, all county executive authority not expressly granted 
by law or interlocal agreement to other officers, boards or commissions is 
reserved to the board of county commissioners acting jointly, severally or 
through its administrative designees and the exercise of such authority is 
subject to the board's final approval and direction. 
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18-1-1. Purchase Orders and Contracts — Competitive Bids 
18-1-2. Contracts Not Requiring Competitive Bids 
18-1-3. Emergency Contracts 
18-1-4. Requisition Agents 
18-1-5. Advertisements for Bids — Deposits 
18-1-6. Collusion Among Bidders and Disclosures — Prohibition 
18-1-7. Opening of Bids 
18-1-8. Awarding of Contracts — Filing of Purchase Order or Contract 
— Public Inspection 
18-1-9. Responsibility of Bidders — Determination 
18-1-10. Rejection of Bids 
18-1-11. Bonds of Bidders 
18-1-12. Assignment of Contracts 
Sec. 18-1-1. Purchase Orders and Contracts — Competitive Bids. Except 
as otherwise herein provided, all county purchase orders and contracts of 
every kind, involving amounts in excess of $5,000.00, for labor and services, 
or for the purchase, lease, or sale of personal property, materials, equipment 
or supplies, shall be let by competitive bidding after advertisement, to the 
lowest responsible bidder, or in the appropriate instance, to the highest 
responsible bidder, depending upon whether the county is to expend or to 
receive the money. 
All purchase orders or contracts less than $5,000.00, and in excess of 
$300.00, shall be let in the open market in a manner calculated to insure the 
best interests of the public and after solicitation of bids by mail, telephone or 
otherwise. All bids in excess of $1,000.00 shall be in writing. Unless otherwise 
authorized-by the board of county commissioners, the purchasing agent shall 
obtain at least three competitive bids. 
The commission may waive the above requirements at such time as the 
public good justifies such action and shall not be prohibited by the terms of 
this section from awarding contracts or purchase orders without 
advertisement or other solicitation if the item to be procured is a brand-name 
type product which can be procured from only one source. Any department, 
office, board or other agency of the county desiring to requisition a 
brand-name type product which would require a waiver of the bidding 
requirements in this section must submit a letter of justification to the 
purchasing agent which must specify why the brand-name type product is 
required and set forth the reasons why normal bidding requirements should 
be waived. No contract or purchase order in excess of $500.00 may be awarded 
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for such brand-name type product without the approval of the commission. 
The purchasing agent must, in the performance of his duties, comply with 
the requirements specified in 17-15-3 U.C.A. 1953. 
Sec. 18*1-2. Contracts Not Requiring Competitive Bids. Contracts which 
by their nature are not adapted to award by competitive bidding, such as 
contracts for the services of individuals possessing a high degree of pro-
fessional skill, where the ability or fitness of the individual plays an important 
part, contracts for the printing of finance committee pamphlets, auditor's 
estimates and departmental reports, contracts for the printing or engraving 
of bonds, water certificates, tax warrants and other evidences of 
indebtedness, contracts for utility services such as water, light, heat, 
telephone and telegraph, and contracts for the purchase of magazines, books, 
periodicals, and similar articles of an educational or instructional nature, shall 
not be subject to the competitive bidding requirements of this ordinance. The 
purchasing agent is expressly authorized to procure from any federal, state or 
local unit, or agency thereof, such materials, supplies, commodities or their 
equivalent, as may be made available through the operation of any legislation, 
without conforming to the competitive bidding requirements of this chapter. 
Regular employment contracts in the service of the county, whether with 
respect to classified service which may be later enacted, or otherwise, shall 
not be subject to the provisions of this chapter, nor shall this chapter be 
applicable to the granting or issuance, pursuant to powers conferred by laws, 
ordinances or resolutions, of franchises, licenses, permits or other 
authorizations by the corporate authorities of the municipality, or by 
departments, offices, institutions, boards, commissions, agencies or other 
instrumentalities of the county. 
Sec. 18-1 -3. Emergency Contracts. In case of an emergency affecting the 
public health or safety, the Salt Lake County Commission may, at a duly 
convened meeting, unanimously require, without public advertisement, that 
contracts be let to the extent necessary to resolve such emergency. The 
resolution or ordinance permitting such action shall fix the date upon which 
such emergency shall terminate, provided that such date may be extended or 
abridged by the commission as circumstances require. 
The purchasing agent, or any agency of the county authorized in writing 
by the purchasing agent, may, subject to the approval of the board of county 
commissioners, purchase in the open market without filing a requisition for 
estimate, and without advertisement, supplies, materials or equipment in an 
amount not exceeding $10,000.00. A full written account of any such 
emergency, together with a requisition for the materials, supplies or 
equipment which it required, shall be submitted immediately to the 
purchasing agent and shall be open to public inspection for a period of at least 
one year subsequent to the date of the emergency purchase. 
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Sec. 18-1-4. Requisition Agents. Each major department, office, board or 
other agency of the county shall certify in writing to the purchasing agent the 
names of such officers or employees as shall be authorized to sign requests for 
purchases for such agency, and all such requests for purchases shall be void 
unless executed by such certified officers or employees and approved by the 
purchasing agent. 
Except as to emergency contracts, no undertaking involving amounts in 
excess of $5,000.00 shall be split into parts by any concerned party so as to 
produce amounts of $5,000.00 or less, for the purpose of avoiding the 
provisions of this ordinance. 
Sec. 18-1-5. Advertisements for Bids — Deposits. All proposals to award 
purchase orders or contracts involving amounts in excess of $5,000.00 shall be 
published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation published in Salt 
Lake County. The board of county commissioners may reject any an all bids 
for any valid reason. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to 
prohibit the purchasing agent from placing additional announcements in 
recognized trade journals. Advertisements for bids shall describe the 
character of the proposed contract or agreement in sufficient detail to enable 
prospective bidders to know what their obligations will be. The description 
may be made either in the advertisement itself, or by reference to detailed 
plans and specifications on file at the time of the publication of the first 
announcement. The advertisement shall state the date, time and place 
assigned for the opening of bids, and no bids shall be received at any time 
subsequent to the time indicated in the announcement. An extension of time 
may, however, be granted for the opening of such bids upon publication in ? 
newspaper of general circulation throughout Salt Lake County of the date tc 
which the bid opening has been extended. The time for the opening of the 
extended bid shall be not less than 10 days after the publication thereof, 
Sundays and legal Holidays excluded. 
Cash, a cashier's check, a certified check or a comptroller's certificate of 
monies owed the particular vendor, as a deposit of good faith, in a reasonable 
amount, but not in excess of 10% of the contract amount, may be required of 
each bidder by the purchasing agent on all bids involving amounts in excess of 
$5,000.00. 
Sec. 18-1-6. Collusion Among Bidders and Disclosures — Prohibition. 
Any agreement or collusion among bidders or prospective bidders, to bid a 
fixed price shall render the bids of such bidders void. Each bidder shall 
accompany his bid with a sworn statement that he has not been a party to any 
such agreement. Any disclosure made or permitted by the purchasing agent 
in advance of the opening of bids, of the terms of the bids submitted in 
response to an advertisement, shall render the entire proceeding void and 
shall require re-advertisement and re-award. 
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Sec. 18-1-7. Opening of Bids. All sealed bids shall be publicly opened by 
the purchasing agent or by an officer or employee in the office of the 
purchasing agent who is duly authorized in writing by the purchasing agent to 
open such bids. 
Sec. 18-1-8. Awarding of Contracts — Filing of Purchase Order or 
Contract — Public Inspection. The award of any contract involving amounts 
in excess of $5,000.00 shall be made by the board of county commissioners to 
the lowest or highest responsible bidders meeting specifications as provided 
in section 18-1-5 above. Each bid, with the name of the bidder, shall be 
entered on a record, which record, with the name of the successful bidder 
indicated thereon, shall after award of the contract or purchase order, be 
open to public inspection in the office of the purchasing agent. 
All purchase orders or contracts involving amounts of $5,000.00 or less 
shall be awarded by the purchasing agent to the lowest or highest responsible 
bidders as provided in section 18-1-1 above and shall be signed by the 
purchasing agent and submitted to the commission for approval and 
ratification. 
An official copy of each awarded purchase order or contract, together 
with all necessary attachments, including assignments and written consents 
of the purchasing agent, shall be retained by the purchasing agent in an 
appropriate file open to the public for such period of time after termination of 
the contract as an action against the county might ensue under applicable 
statutes of limitations. After such period, purchase orders, contracts and 
attachments may be destroyed by direction of purchasing agent. 
Sec. 18-1-9. Responsibility of Bidders — Determination. In determining 
the responsibility of any bidder, the commission may take into account other 
factors in addition to financial responsibility, such as past records or 
transactions with the bidder, experience, adequacy of equipment, ability to 
complete performance within a specified time limit and other pertinent con-
siderations. 
Sec. 18-1-10. Rejection of Bids. Any and all bids received in response to 
an advertisement may be rejected by the board of county commissioners if the 
bidder is not deemed responsible, or the character or quality of the services, 
supplies, materials, equipment or labor does not conform to requirements, or 
if the public interest may otherwise be served thereby. 
Sec. 18-1-11. Bonds of Bidders. Bonds with sufficient sureties and in such 
amounts as shall be deemed adequate and approved by the board of county 
commissioners, not only to insure performance of the contract or purchase 
order in the time and manner prescribed, but also to save, indemnify, and 
hold the county harmless against losses, damages, claims, liabilities, 
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judgments, costs, and expenses which may accrue in consequence of the 
granting or the contract or purchase order, shall be required of each bidder on 
such contracts and purchase orders as involve amounts in excess of $5,000.00. 
$5,000.00. 
Sec 18-1-12. Assignment of Contracts. No contract awarded to the 
lowest responsible bidder or to the highest responsible bidder, as the case 
may be, shall be assignable by the successful bidder without the written 
consent of the board of county commissioners. In no event shall a contract or 
any part thereof be assigned to a bidder who is declared not to be a 
responsible bidder in the consideration of bids submitted in response to 




18-2-1. Purchasing Agent — Salary — Bond 
18-2-2. Purchasing Agent — Powers and Duties 
18-2-3. Revolving Fund 
18-2-4. Purchasing Agent — Execution of Contracts 
18-2-5. Contracts Executed in Violation of This Ordinance 
18-2-6. Local Improvement Projects 
18-2-7. -Penalty 
See. 18*2-1. Purchasing Agent — Salary — Bond. The purchasing agent 
shall perform or direct the performance of all such duties as are required by 
the provisions of this chapter.* The salary for the purchasing agent shall be 
fixed by the board of county commissioners which shall, in addition, require 
the purchasing agent to post bond with adequate surety in an amount to be 
determined by the commission and conditioned upon his faithful performance 
of such duties as are here required. 
See. 18-2-2. Purchasing Agent — Powers And Duties. The purchasing 
agent shall: 
(1) Recommend adoption, promulgation, and from time to time 
revision, of the rules and regulations of the proper conduct of this office; 
(2) Constitute the sole agent of the county in contracting for labor, 
materials, or services, or for the purchase, lease, or sale of personal property, 
materials, equipment or supplies, in conformity with the provisions of this 
Title provided, however, that all contracts and purchase orders must be 
submitted to the commission for approval and ratification as required by 
section 17-5-74, UCA - 1953; 
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